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ISSN 0966-4246 negative relationship exists and is strong. We take most of the relevant data from Neumeyer
and Perri (2005), where data sources are fully discussed. The countries we choose are Ko-
rea, Mexico, Philippines, Brazil and Argentina. All ﬁve countries experienced major ﬁnancial
crises within the time period. For Korea, we have national accounts data from 1980 to 2001.
This data captures the crisis that occurred in 1997. For Mexico, the data is between 1980 and
2001. Mexico faced the Tequila Crisis in 1994. The Philippines data covers 1982 to 2001 and
includes the crisis in 1997. Data for Brazil goes from 1991 to 2001 and includes the crisis in
1999. In Argentina the data from 1980 to 2001 includes the crisis in 2001.
To construct real interest rates, we use the nominal rates reported in Neumeyer and Perri
(2005) net of inﬂation, which we measure with the United States GDP deﬂator.1 To measure
TFP, we follow Meza and Quintin (2006). They adjust TFP by variations in capital utilization,
using the model of Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988). In that model the depreci-
ation rate is a function of the rate of capital utilization. We assume that in the long run the
depreciation rate is 5% on a yearly basis. Labor data in Argentina is not reported quarterly, but
instead reported twice per year. Thus, we measure TFP in Argentina on a yearly basis. In the
case of Argentina, we used data reported in Kehoe (2003).
We present this data in two ways. First we report data on the real interest rates and de-
viations from trend for TFP.2 This is Figure 1. From Figure 1, we highlight the pronounced
negative contemporaneous correlation for Argentina, Korea and Mexico. We also report the
correlation coefﬁcients between TFP’s and lagged interest rates in Figure 2. For Argentina,
Korea and Mexico the coefﬁcient is negative for contemporaneous interest rates and every
lagged value of the interest rate. For the Philippines, lagged interest rates show similar nega-
tive correlations, while contemporaneous interest rates show a small positive correlation.3
[Figure 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
The relationship between TFP and interest rates is very strong in the immediate aftermath
of a crisis. This particular aspect of the relationship is detailed in Meza and Quintin (2006) who
1We follow the procedure used in Meza and Quintin (2006).
2We use the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to compute deviations from trend. We ﬁrst calculate logarithms of the TFP
series and then use the ﬁlter.
3The negative relationship between TFP and contemporaneous or lagged interest rates does not exist for Brazil.
We posit an explanation. The aggregate labor data for Brazil reported in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) was con-
structed using urban employment and average hours worked in manufacturing. In the data, a large fall in aggregate
labor would contribute to making the TFP fall smaller, as more of the changes in output would be attributed to
labor. This is important because we present a model where labor in the manufacturing sector falls more than
aggregate labor supply, after an increase in interest rates.
4use slightly differing data than what we present. We highlight ﬁve speciﬁc crises and point on
the relationship between interest rates and TFP in these crises. The vertical bars in Figure 1
refer to a year in which a ﬁnancial crisis took place. In four of the ﬁve countries we see sharp
increases in interest rates and sharp falls in TFP.
The second empirical observation we demonstrate is the negative correlation between agri-
cultural employment shares and TFP. In Benjamin and Meza (2006) we have shown that the
primary reason for the fall in TFP during the Korean crisis is a shift in resources from manu-
facturing to agriculture.
Our data source is the International Labour Organization. To construct labor shares by sec-
tor, we use yearly data. Our basic unit of analysis are employment shares in agriculture and
manufacturing.4 We exclude Mexico from our sample because available data does not include
1994, the year in which the Tequila Crisis took place. We begin by examining the behavior of
the labor shares around a crisis. In Figure 3, for each country we report 3 variables: the share
of employment in agriculture relative to total employment, the respective share for manufac-
turing, and the share of agriculture relative to the sum of agriculture and manufacturing. This
last variable is most relevant for the predictions of the model we discuss in the next section. We
mark a crisis year with a vertical bar. For the four countries in our sample, except the Philip-
pines, the employment share in agriculture increases either on the year of or the year after after
the respective ﬁnancial crisis. The opposite happens to the manufacturing share. In the case
of the share of agriculture relative to the sum of agriculture and manufacturing, this variable
increases in the four countries.
That we are constrained to using yearly data may account for the fact that the shares move
either on the year of the crisis or the year after. For example, in the case of Korea, the crisis
occurred in the last quarter of 1997. At the same time, we can see that labor shares react in
1998. The case of the Philippines is similar in terms of timing. In the case of Argentina, the
crisis hit in mid-2001, and the shares react during that year. In Brazil, the crisis took place at
the beginning of 1999, and the shares react during that year.5
[Figure 3 about here]
4We do not construct hours worked because some countries in our sample lack data on hours worked in
agriculture, or have no data for years of ﬁnancial crisis. Since ﬂuctuations in the labor input (aggregate hours
worked) are due, mostly, to changes in the extensive margin, not changes in hours per worker, such additional
detail would not likely change the results.
5Given that we have few observations, we decided not to detrend this data. If the time series were longer, we
would expect to observe a reduction in the agricultural employment share. In the case of Argentina we display
data for 1996-2001 only. Data before 1996 corresponds only to the Greater Buenos Aires region.
5as shown in the data, that intermediation costs are more important in manufacturing than agri-
culture. As interest rates rise, intermediation becomes more important and entrepreneurs take
on less productive projects to avoid intermediation. After interest rates rise, resources leave
manufacturing to enter agriculture.
We consider an economy with three kinds of agents. The agents are a consumer, a con-
tinuum of entrepreneurs and a ﬁnancial intermediary (a bank). Of these, the most interesting
decisions are made by entrepreneurs and the bank. We begin by describing entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs live for one period only and are risk neutral. They choose to undertake pro-
duction in one of the two sectors. In their chosen sector, entrepreneurs produce goods from
sector-speciﬁc capital and labor.
Each sector has its own technology. Let us begin with agriculture. Agriculture uses a
simple, standardized technology. Its production is observable and deterministic. All entrepre-
neurs in agriculture have equal productivity. Because of these factors, intermediating capital
is costless in agriculture. The agricultural good is produced using its own capital, ka, with a
technology Y (ka) = Akα
a, where 0 < α < 1 and A > 0.
Manufacturingismorecomplex. Thisisbecauseofthepresenceofriskandofentrepreneur-
speciﬁc human capital. Production is risky in that output can be either high or low and the
entrepreneur can be either a success or a failure. We label the two outcomes in manufacturing,
Yh and Yl, respectively. Formally
Y
m =

 
 
Yh(km) = Ahkα
m if successful,
Yl(km) = Alkα
m if the project fails.
where Ah > A > Al ≥ 0.
Entrepreneurs differ in their skill level in running a manufacturing ﬁrm. An entrepreneur’s
skill level is private information. Each entrepreneur has a type, θ, such that with probability
π(θ) the high outcome occurs. These probabilities are independent across type, of which there
is a continuum of types of measure one. Entrepreneurs are ordered such that π is an increasing,
measurable function, so high types are more likely to be successful manufacturers than low
types. There is a density f(θ) associated with the distribution of types. For simplicity, we
assume f is uniform, so f(θ) = θ.
Thereisidiosyncraticriskinmanufacturing, butnoaggregaterisk. Consumerswhoownthe
capital are risk averse. Because of this, the allocation of capital to entrepreneurs is undertaken
through a bank who can diversify the idiosyncratic risk away from the consumers. Entering
any given period, the bank has acquired a supply of capital from the consumer. It intermediates
7this capital so it can be used in production. Some of this capital is delivered to entrepreneurs.
The rest is sent abroad.
The bank decides what choices to make through negotiations. The bank holds negotiations
with the full continuum of entrepreneurs to allocate capital and pick interest rates. Negotiations
are speciﬁcally over ”contracts,” which we deﬁne as a set of type speciﬁc capital deliveries and
interest rates. Negotiated capital is delivered directly to the entrepreneur, who if successful
makes interest payments. The interest rates that are negotiated are only relevant to successful
entrepreneurs. Unsuccessful entrepreneurs have all of their output seized by the bank. For-
mally, a contracts is: (km(θ),ka(θ),rm(θ),ra(θ)) ∈ <4
+.
After contracts are agreed upon, the entrepreneur chooses which sector to enter and which
pair of promised capital and interest rates to accept. A failure to earn the high return leads to
bankruptcy and the entire output seized by the bank.
Finally, entrepreneurs in the manufacturing sector must borrow additionally to pay for the
cost of intermediating capital, which we denote by e. Thus, each period an entrepreneur in
manufacturing borrows e+km from the bank. Both capital and the intermediation costs depre-
ciate completely at the end of the period.
In equilibrium, all types of entrepreneurs are offered the same contract. Pooling across en-
trepreneurs occurs because the uniformity of the bankruptcy policy does not offer any attempts
at screening. Consequently there is no means to prevent low types from imitating higher types
who would otherwise be offered more favorable terms.
We study negotiations that lead to the same outcome as an informationally constrained,
efﬁcient mechanism. The equilibrium contract maximizes total surplus subject to incentive
constraints on the choice of sector by entrepreneurs and a resource constraint. For entrepre-
neurs that choose agriculture the incentive constraint requires higher expected proﬁts in the
agricultural sector than the manufacturing sector. Let A be the set of types that choose agricul-
ture. The incentive constraint is explicitly written as:
Y (ka) − r
aka ≥ π(θ)(Yh(km) − r
m(e + km)) ∀θ ∈ A (1)
For entrepreneurs that choose manufacturing the sign is reversed as they require higher
proﬁts in manufacturing. In equilibrium, for most types, these constraints do not bind. Only
one individual type possesses a constraint which holds in equilibrium with equality. We call
the critical entrepreneur’s type z. Types above the critical value choose manufacturing and
types lower than the critical value choose agriculture. Formally the single incentive constraint
8we subject the negotiations to is:
Y (ka) − r
aka = π(z)(Yh(km) − r
m(e + km)). (2)
To state the problem equilibrium contracts solve, we need a deﬁnition of total surplus. For
a given critical value, z, we write the probability measure for ﬁrms that invest in manufacturing
and are successful in its production as:
Φ(z) =
1 − z2
2
. (3)
Those that enter manufacturing and receive a low return have a measure of:
Ψ(z) = 1 − z − Φ(z) =
1 − 2z − z2
2
.
Finally we deﬁne kab to be the capital sent abroad. Total surplus equals revenues from
successes, failures, and capital abroad. Formally total surplus is:
F(z)Y (ka) + Φ(z)Yh(km) + Ψ(z)Yl(km) + r
wkab. (4)
Note that we assume the goods produced in the two sectors are perfect substitutes. This
allows us to talk about productivity differences without explicitly modeling the consumer’s
decisions.8
The resource constraint requires capital in each sector and abroad to equal capital the bank
has to lend, k. It is written as:
kab + F(z)ka + (1 − F(z))(e + km) = k. (5)
The formal negotiations maximize expression (4) over ka,km,kab and z, subject to equa-
tions (2) and (5).
We now solve for the outcome of the negotiations. The bank’s capital, k, affects only
outcomes of capital lent abroad, kab. Variables z, km, and ka are important for studying pro-
ductivity and are entirely determined by the above problem. They are characterized through a
set of three ﬁrst order conditions:
8This assumption is not necessary for productivity differences across sectors to exist in equilibrium. It is
merely a simplifying assumption.
9max
km,ka,kab,z,la,lm(ω)
Azk
α
al
µ
a − F(z)wla +
Z 1
z
(π(ω)Ah + (1 − π(ω))Al)k
α
mlm(ω)
µf(ω)dω
−
Z 1
z
wlm(ω)f(ωd(ω) − (1 − F(z))(1 + r
w)e + r
wkab (11)
s.t.
kab + F(z)ka + (1 − F(z))(km) = k.
The intermediation cost e is a ﬁxed cost. Hence our theory is consistent with any costs
required to undertake business in the manufacturing sector, including intermediation costs and
hiring costs. To allow for these potential interpretations, we subtract the intermediation costs
directly from the realized output at the end of the period.
The model as it currently stands is not closed. In the previous model, the consumer’s
decisions did not affect productivity or any other important outcome of the negotiation. Here,
the inclusion of a labor market requires the wage to be determined in equilibrium. Productivity
depends on wages. Hence we need a maximization decision from the consumer to construct
labor supply. We consider a consumer who supplies a deposit, kt, to the bank in every period.
She is endowed with an initial capital stock, k0. She receives a payment rb
t for each unit of
capital supplied to the bank. We assume complete international capital markets and consider
only perfectly foreseen changes in the interest rate.9 A consumer can buy and sell bonds bt+1,
net debt with respect to the rest of the world, at the world interest rate. She is endowed with
an initial stock of net debt, b0. We denote her consumption in each period ct. Finally, the
consumer supplies labor in every period, which we denote by lst, and receives wage wt.
A consumer solves:
max
∞ X
t=0
β
tu(ct,lst)
s.t.
ct + bt+1 + kt+1 − (1 + r
w
t+1)bt ≤ wtlst + r
b
tkt∀t.
Parameter 0 < β < 1 represents the discount factor. We close the model with the require-
ment that labor supply equals labor demand (ignoring time subscripts):
9See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for a version of a small open economy model with complete markets
and uncertainty.
12produce small effects. For example, with a uniform density, the further apart Al and Ah are,
the smaller the key relationships are.
Now we are ready to select speciﬁc parameter values. To measure the change in TFP we
need six observations from the data. Namely, we use measures of productivity in each sector,
the aggregate capital and labor share, the intermediation cost and hours worked per capita.
We follow Quintin and Amaral (2005) in choosing the labor share as the residual of pay-
ments to entrepreneurs and capital in National Product Accounts. Speciﬁcally, we choose the
share for rents of national income to entrepreneurs directly from their calculations, noting that
it is a value computed from US data. Other researchers, such as Young (1995), have found
income shares for Korea that are very similar to the ones in the US.
For the productivities in the manufacturing sector, we begin by setting Al equal to zero.10
Setting Al equal to zero allows us to solve the labor allocation problem in the manufacturing
sector analytically.11
Both Ah and A are taken from Benjamin and Meza (2006). We measured Ah using a Cobb-
Douglas production function and data on capital, labor and GDP for the manufacturing sector
in Korea in 1995. In the model we match this number to the unweighed average productivity
of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector. We measured A following a similar procedure for the
agricultural sector in Korea.12
We choose
γ
¯ c to match a ratio of working time ls to time available for work L equal to 33%.
This value is close to the ratio in Korean data in 1995, which is 30%. We choose L arbitrarily
to equal 40.
For quantitative purposes, we associate intermediation costs exclusively with the ﬁnancial
intermediation of capital. For intermediation costs, we make the model match the ratio of in-
termediation costs to loans in 1995. Since in the data our measure of intermediation costs in
agriculture is positive, whereas in the model the cost is zero, we subtract the ratio of interme-
diation costs in agriculture from the manufacturing one. Note that loans in the model equal
e + km. Thus, the model counterpart of our measure of intermediation costs is e/(e + km).
Setting this expression equal to the intermediation cost in the data determines a value for e.
We summarize the chosen values in Table 3.
10Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004) make a similar assumption in their quantitative work.
11This assumption creates a large variance between the expected outcome of successful and unsuccessful ﬁrms.
In the data, failures and successes are closer together. Aw, Ching, and Roberts (2003) report productivity differ-
ences of unsuccessful and successful manufacturing ﬁrms to be around 25%.
12We are using a constant returns to scale function to measure the productivities. Our model has decreasing
returns in each technology.
14is incentive compatible. (There are an inﬁnite number of pairs of such interest rates). Allo-
cation 3 also produces a higher total surplus than allocation 2, because domestically produced
output equals TFP(z)k∗α and by our previous algebra TFP (z3)) equals TFP(z1). By our
assumption TFP(z1) ≥ TFP(z2).
Hence x3 is a superior allocation to x2. But this contradicts the assumption that x2, solved
the negotiation problem when the interest rate was r2.
20Table 1: Correlations with the Relative Share of Agricultural Labor
Country Korea Argentina Philippines Brazil
Correlation Between Agriculture and Interest Rates 0.72 0.77 0.44 0.88
Correlation Between Agriculture and TFP. -0.79 -0.90 -0.19 0.34
Table 2: Intermediation Costs: Financial Services Used Relative to Loans
Measure of Loans Intermediation Costs in Agriculture Intermediation Costs in Manufacturing
Loans 0.028 0.062
Loans+Equipment Funds 0.048 0.074
Table 3: Parameter Values
Parameter α µ A Ah Al e
γ
¯ c
Value 0.3 0.4 0.056 0.203 0 0.169 1.65
Table 4: Generated Values After an Increase in the Interest Rate
Observation Change in TFP Labor share in agriculture before Labor share after
Model 3.6 % 2.6% 6.6 %
Data 4.1 % 33.7% 38.1%
21Figure 1: TFP and Interest Rates
22Figure 2: Correlations Between Interest Rates and Various Lags of TFP
23Figure 3: Labor Shares Around Crises
24